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NOTES
UNDERGROUND

WATER

The plaintiff had been obtaining water from an artesian well on his land
since 1907. The artesian basin from which he appropriated his water was twelve
miles long and six miles wide and supported about six thousand wells. The plaintiff's well had always supplied about fifty gallons of water a minute of which
about four gallons was used to satisfy his domestic purposes, and the balance
was used as a source of power to operate a hydraulic ram which circulated the
water throughout his domestic water system. The water used as power escaped
into a ditch and was not thereafter used. In 1934, the defendant sank a well
which temporarily retarded the plaintiff's flow to approximately four gallons a
minute, necessitating the installation of a pump which he continued to use in
subsequent years, although the defendant did not interfere with the plaintiff's
flow after 1934. Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover as damages
the cost of installing and operating the pump because of the temporary nature
of the defendant's interference. Hansen v. Salt Lake City, 205 P. (2d) 255 (Utah
1949).
The opinion of Justices Wade and McDonough includes dictuml to the
effect that where a subsequent appropriator lowered the static pressure of a prior
appropriator's well so that it became necessary to make permanent changes in his
method of diversion to satisfy his previously established beneficial use, the subse2
quent appropriator must bear the additional expense. The question which was
1.

2.

Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 205 P. (2d) 255 (Utah 1949). The varied reasoning of
the members of the court prevented any one opinion from being the opinion of
the court.
Salt Lake City v. Gardner, 39 Utah 30, 114 Pac. 147 (1911).
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decided in this opinion was whether the subsequent appropriator must pay for
a permanent improvement which was installed to cope with a temporary, partial interference with the flow of water.
In a concurring opinion Mr. Chief Justice Pratt expressed the view that
the water which the senior appropriator had been beneficially using arrived at
the point of diversion, and that the junior appropriator could not be held to
account for the senior appropriator's means of appropriating the water.3 M.Ir.
Justice Wolf, who also wrote a concurring opinion, reasoned that the senior
appropriator was not legally injured if he could obtain the amount of water
appropriated by reasonable means, and that under a policy which encourages
the full development of the resources, a reasonable method of diversion is imperative, and if the junior appropriator were required to maintain the static
pressure of a senior appropriator's well, or pay the cost of pumping apparatus
to take the place of lost pressure, the policy which encourages the full development of the resources would be defeated.4 Another opinion, concurring in result,
but dissenting in reasoning, written by Mr. Justice Latimer, attacked the
majority opinion as being unrealistic. He reasoned that in an artesian basin
which produces water for more than six thousand wells, each well lowers the
pressure and decreases the flow of the other wells, and, therefore, any subsequent appropriation interferes with the rights of the existing owners. To require
the last appropriator to maintain the conditions under which the prior appropriators had obtained their supply, or to make an equitable adjustment in damages,
would be prohibitive, and impede the development of the state. He concluded
by saying that a prior appropriator should be protected in the amount of water
which he was beneficially using, if it were obtained by reasonably efficient means.
However, if the original means of diversion had become inconsistant with the
development of the area, the prior appropriator should bear the additional cost
imposed on him by reason of the changed conditions.5
In Utah, prior to 1935, percolating waters were not part of the waters of
the state and were not subject to appropriation. 6 It was held that subterranean
waters and those of artesian basins were not subject to appropriation, but belonged to the owners of the land. Each owner in an artesian district was entitled to a
proportionate share of the water according to his surface area as compared to
the whole.7 This was recognized as the law governing the use of waters from
artesian basins until 1935. In that year the court held in Wrathall v. Johnson8
that artesian basin waters were flowing in sufficiently defined channels to be
included as the property of the public and subject to appropriation. The holding
in this case was later incorporated into the laws of Utah.9
3.

Supra Note 1 at 268.

4.
5.

Ibid. at 272.
Ibid. at 273.

6.

Cresent Mining Co. v. Silver King Mining Co., 17 Utah 444, 54 Pac. 244 (1898)
Willow Creek Irrigating Co. v. Michealson, 21 Utah 248, 60 Pac. 943 (1900).
Horne v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 59 Utah 297, 202 Pac. 815 (1900).
86 Utah 50, 40 P. (2d) 755, 788 (1935).
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, sec. 100-1-1. "All the waters in this state, whether
above or under the ground are hereby declared to be the property of the public,
subject to all the existing rights to the use thereof."

7.
8.
9.

NoTEs
The courts of Arizona,10 California,11 and Idahol2 have been called upon
to decide the question of the extent to which the first appropriator is protected
in maintaining the conditions under which he first began to divert his groundwater, and as to whether he was entitled to compensation for the additional cost
of pumping if the later appropriator reduced the common supply. In each instance the prior appropriator was protected in maintaining the conditions under
which he first pumped his water; and in each case such protection was in the
form of an injunction against the junior appropriator who sought to interfere
with these conditions. The California and Idaho courts indicated that the senior
appropriator would be entitled to compensation for the additional cost of diverting his appropriation if the later appropriator caused the common supply
to be permanently reduced. Although a Colorado casel3 gave the junior appropriator a vested right in the conditions existing when he first made his appropriation, it would seem that he could have no greater right than that of the senior
appropriator. Therefore, it would be logical to assume that the senior appropriator must also have a vested right in the conditions under which he first made
his appropriation. Under this line of reasoning, the Colorado court could reach
the same result as those stated in the foregoing cases.
In a recent California case14 all appropriators were pumping water from a
single water basin. The prior appropriators sought to enjoin the subsequent
appropriators from lowering the water table below the safe point of yield. The
court found that the subsequent appropriators had taken more than the unappropriated water for a greater time than the statutory period, and had acquired
a prescriptive right to some of the water claimed by the prior appropriators.
The court entered an order requiring all appropriators to cut their consumption
twenty-five percent so that the water table would not be lowered below the
safe point of yield. While this case seems to follow no specific rule, it does
achieve an equitable distribution and promotes the expansion and development
of the area by encouraging the fullest use of the water, though the dissent says
that while past cases were "based upon a philosophy of rugged individualism"
15
..[this case] "is based on a philosophy of bureaucratic communism."
Since the rights in water changed from riparian to appropriation, several
factors have been considered in the relative rights of the takers. Among these
factors are priority of appropriation, beneficiality of use to user, reasonableness of
the means of diversion, and benefit to the state of a whole. The first of these
is held controlling in the ruling opinion here, in general, though modified in
this case as to damages because of the temporary nature of the interference. The
others are stressed in the various concurring opinions. In order to have no confusion in the matter the state legislature or the courts will have to state which
principle is controlling. It is impossible to arrive at consistant decisions in a
10. Prima Farms Co. v. Proctor, 30 Ariz. 96, 245 Pac. 369 (1926).
11. City of Lodi v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 7 Cal. (2d) 316, 60 P. (2d)
12.
13.
14.

439 (1936).
Noh v. Stoner, 53 Idaho 651, 26 P. (2d) 1112 (1933).
Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 28 P. (2d) 247 (1933).
City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, Cal. 1949, 207 P. (2d)

15.

Id. at 37.

17 (1949).
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series of cases if the courts have no ruling principle to follow. Utah seems to
have given priority of appropriation the greatest weight by statute. Apparently,

had the interference by the defendant been permanent in this case, the plaintiff
could have obtained injunctive relief or collected damages to pay for his conversion to a modern means of diversion. Had the facts differed so that this was
the case, one gathers that the plaintiff would have been entitled to relief by
Justices Wade and McDonough, but not by the concurring judges, who outnumbering them, would have been the majority, in which case possibly the cases
relied on by Justices Wade and McDonough would have been directly overruled.
In his opinion, Justice Wade admits that the burden placed upon the subsequent appropriator of reimbursing all the prior appropriators for any damages
seems bad, but states that "it is not so bad as it may appear"16 for though each
appropriator does lower the static head pressure of all the prior wells, it is often
not noticeable and so does not harm the former appropriator. Carrying the prior
appropriator control theory to its logical conclusion: if one thousand wells were
in existance, the one thousand and first appropriator would have to pay for any
adjustments which the one thousand prior appropriators might have to make.
He would probably settle in some other state.
In his opinion, Justice Latimer, in arguing that such extreme weight given
to the priority of appropriation hurts state development, admits that the prior
appropriator will be hurt in the interest of the state as a whole, and says, much
like Justice Wade, that "it is not as harsh as it appears"17 for if the prior appropriator, himself, had been forced to pay all the appropriators prior to him,
he never would have obtained any water in the first place.
In both justices opinions, the reasons following the "not so bad" clause
seem weak. The weakness of these reasons is undoubtedly the cause of the
present confusion as to which factor shall rule. If the subsequent appropriator is
to pay for the changes necessitated, appropriations may be forced to stop, and
the whole state will be injured. If the appropriator must pay for such damages,
his rights are adversely affected. It seems to lead to the ancient problem of
property (prior appropriation, here) rights versus public policy. In the long
run, public policy must be served.
It is readily apparent that much of the confusion and embarrassment experienced by the Utah court could have been avoided if the legislature had
required that a survey be made of the various artesian basins, and the number,
use, and depth of the wells had been limited so that they would not have been
depleted below the safe point of yield.18 Every appropriator would then have
been put on notice as to his rights in relation to all other appropriators and the
present dilemma might never have arisen.
Wyoming can escape the labyrinth of conflicting rights as they now exist'
between the appropriators of underground waters and the appropriators of sur16.
17.

Supra Note 1, at 262.
Id. at 275.

18.

Id. at 270.

NOTES
face waters by requiring that all the waters of the state be governed, as nearly
as practicable, by the same laws. On the basis of this premise, the State should
make an initial survey of the underground waters of the State so as to determine
the safe point of yield in a given area. 19 This the State Engineer may now do.
Permits should be granted to prevent users in the area on the basis of priority
of appropriation and beneficiality of use, under our present underground water
statute.2 0 Subsequent appropriators, however, should be required to obtain a
permit before drilling for water, and the granting of such permit should be
predicated upon the findings of the State Engineer in regard to the safe yield
of the area and as to reasonableness of the proposed depth and pumping capa-

city.21 The courts should not hold that a prior user gains a vested right in his
method of diversion; these rights should be held tentative and flexible so that

they can be adapted to future contingencies which may arise.2 2 Such policies are
in complete accord with the purpose of conservation; they provide for the
complete use of underground water without fear of dissipating the resources of
the State.
M. L. van BENSCHOrEN.

ONE ASPECT OF SECTION 117 J RELIEF
This paper is an evaluation of the Commissioners attempt to have livestock excluded from the benfits of Section 117 J of the Internal Revenue Code
relief.
Farmer Jones is in the dairy and hog raising business. He maintains his
dairy herd at a constant amount by adding calves the herd produces and selling
old cows that are no longer useful as well as the excess young calves. The hog
breeding herd is replaced annually (as is the custom in the industry) with
the farmer's own young sows and a purchased boar
19.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, Supp. 1949, sec. 71-416, "The State Engineer is hereby
authorized and directed to proceed with the determination of the capacity of the
various underground pits, geological structures of formations in the State to yield
such waters. After the boundaries and capacities of any such pit or formation or
other geological structure containing underground water have been fixed by such
determination, the State Engineer shall give notice of such determination to the
State Board of Control, which Board shall then proceed with the adjudication of
said water within the area supplied from this particular underground pit . . .
Interested parties must show . . . proof of benficial application of the water
derived therefrom . . ."

20. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, Supp. 1949, sec. 71-412, "In order that all parties may be
protected in their lawful rights to the use of underground water for beneficial
purposes, every person . . . shall . . . file . . . a statement of claim . . . which
• . . shall contain . .. the nature of the use on which the claim is based . . ., the
location of the well or wells by legal subdivisions, depth to the water table, size
of well, type of well, . . . type and method of pumping, horsepower of pump,
amount of water pumped each year, the amount of water claimed and a log of

the foundations encountered in drilling or digging of the well; . . ."
21.

National Resources Planning Board, State Water Law in the Development of the
West, United States Government Printing Office, 1943, p. 84.

22. Hutchins, Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West, (1942) p. 178.

